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Abstract: I argue that in epistemically well-designed scientific communities, scientists are united 
by mutual epistemic responsibilities, and epistemic responsibilities are understood not merely as 
epistemic but also as moral duties. Epistemic responsibilities can be understood as moral duties 
because they contribute to the well-being of other human beings by showing respect for them 
especially in their capacity as knowers. A moral account of epistemically responsible behaviour is 
needed to supplement accounts that appeal to scientists’ self-interests or personal epistemic goals. 
This is because neither the self-interest nor the epistemic account can always explain why it is 
rational for an individual scientist to be epistemically responsible. 
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1 Introduction 
The social epistemology of scientific knowledge is often understood as a study of the 
properties of epistemically well-designed scientific communities (Kitcher 1993, 304). Scientific 
communities are epistemically well-designed when their social practices and institutional 
arrangements promote the epistemic goals of science, including significant truth (Kitcher 1993) and 
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empirical success (Solomon 2001). Social practices and institutional arrangements can promote 
epistemic goals directly, by conducing towards them, or indirectly, by being connected to some 
other factor that conduces towards them. For example, a distribution of research efforts is thought to 
advance the epistemic goals of science indirectly by ensuring that competing theories or methods 
will receive their share of resources (Kitcher 1990, 1993; Solomon 1992, 2001). A distribution of 
research efforts is epistemically beneficial in certain phases of inquiry, when it is not yet possible to 
tell which theory (or theories) will be true or most successful empirically, or which method (or 
methods) will lead to a breakthrough. When competing theories have different epistemic virtues or 
when different methods have complementary advantages, it is more reasonable to distribute 
resources among the theories or the methods, than to allocate all available resources to one theory 
or method. 
I argue that in epistemically well-designed scientific communities, scientists are 
united by mutual epistemic responsibilities. By epistemic responsibility is meant a duty to be 
epistemically responsible for one’s knowledge claims to a particular audience. I argue that the duty 
of epistemic responsibility can promote the epistemic goals of science indirectly by strengthening 
the social cohesiveness of scientific communities and by facilitating transformative criticism. That 
the duty of epistemic responsibility plays an epistemically valuable role in scientific communities 
gives rise to the question of what motivates individual scientists to fulfil their epistemic 
responsibilities. While epistemically responsible behaviour serves the epistemic goals of science, it 
may not always help individual scientists achieve their personal epistemic and non-epistemic goals. 
Epistemically responsible behaviour requires time and effort, and individual scientists may 
sometimes perceive it as an unnecessary burden.  
In order to understand what prompts individual scientists to be epistemically 
responsible, I introduce three accounts of epistemically responsible behaviour: a self-interest, an 
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epistemic, and a moral account. According to the self-interest account, scientists behave in an 
epistemically responsible way because they believe that it serves their own non-epistemic ends 
(e.g., career advancement). According to the epistemic account, scientists behave in an 
epistemically responsible way because they believe that it serves their personal epistemic ends (e.g., 
the advancement of their own research program). According to the moral account, scientists behave 
in an epistemically responsible way because they believe that it is their moral duty to do so. 
Scientists may behave in an epistemically responsible way for any of these three reasons, including 
a mixture of two or three of them.  
My main thesis is that in epistemically well-designed scientific communities, 
epistemic responsibilities are understood not merely as epistemic but also as moral duties. When 
epistemic responsibilities are understood as moral duties, they are followed because they are 
thought to contribute to the well-being of other human beings. I argue also that epistemic 
responsibilities can be understood as moral duties because they actually serve the well-being of 
other human beings by showing respect for them especially in their capacity as knowers. By respect 
is meant the kind of respect that all human beings are owed morally merely because they are human 
beings, regardless of their social position or individual achievement. The moral account of 
epistemically responsible behaviour is not meant to replace a self-interest or a purely epistemic 
account. Rather, it is meant to supplement them. The moral account is needed to bridge the gap 
between individual scientists’ personal ends and the impersonal epistemic ends of science when 
neither the self-interest nor the epistemic account (or a combination of them) succeeds in explaining 
why it is rational for an individual scientist to behave in an epistemically responsible way. The 
upshot is that epistemically well-designed scientific communities are moral communities in the 
sense that community members are bound together by epistemic responsibilities that can be 
understood as moral obligations.  
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In Section 2, I introduce the duty of epistemic responsibility and explain how it can 
promote the epistemic goals of science. In Section 3, I argue that a moral account of epistemically 
responsible behaviour is needed to supplement a self-interest and an epistemic account. In Section 
4, I address two concerns about the moral account of epistemically responsible behaviour. One 
worry is that the moral account is too demanding for most scientists. Another worry is that the 
universal and impartial nature of moral duties is not compatible with the observation that in the 
actual practice of science, epistemic responsibilities are often confined to particular scientific 
communities. In Section 5, I explore further the moral justification of epistemic responsibility. 
 
2 What Is Epistemic Responsibility? 
 
While epistemically responsible action is sometimes understood in a broad sense 
encompassing all actions guided by a desire to have true beliefs (Kornblith 1983, 47), I focus on 
one category of epistemically responsible actions: the actions of giving reasons with the aim of 
satisfying the standards of evidence endorsed by a particular audience. A scientist is epistemically 
responsible in making a knowledge claim when she provides sufficient evidence in its support or 
adopts a defence commitment with respect to the claim. What counts as sufficient evidence depends 
on what her main audience is willing to accept without further inquiries or challenges. A defence 
commitment means that a scientist takes on a duty to defend or revise the claim whenever it is 
challenged with counter-evidence or some other kind of argument. Thus, epistemic responsibility 
does not require a scientist to cite evidence in support of all her claims. Insofar as her claims are not 
challenged, she does not need to defend them. As Michael Williams explains, epistemic justification 
in this sense is ‘like innocence in a court of law: presumptive but in need of defence in the face of 
contrary evidence’ (2001, 25). In this section, I argue that epistemically responsible actions promote 
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the epistemic goals of science indirectly by strengthening the social cohesiveness of scientific 
communities and by facilitating transformative criticism. Both social cohesiveness and 
transformative criticism are essential to the epistemic success of scientific communities. 
My argument is meant to improve on the standard view of scientific communities. 
According to the standard view, the social cohesiveness of scientific communities is due to shared 
concepts, beliefs, epistemic values, and epistemic goals (Wray 2007, 344). Community members 
share many concepts and beliefs because they have undergone similar education and they are 
familiar with the basic literature on their subject matter of inquiry (Kuhn 1996, 177). It is precisely 
because community members can take for granted many assumptions about the world and the 
method of studying the world, that scientific communities are efficient units for conducting 
scientific research (Wray 2011, 174). However, in order for communities to function efficiently it is 
not necessary that community members adopt a dogmatic attitude toward their shared assumptions. 
The assumptions are epistemically justified as long as they are not challenged. 
While the concept of scientific community can be applied to various social groups in 
science, including the community of all scientists, many social epistemologists are concerned with 
the so called specialty communities. As Thomas Kuhn famously claimed, specialty communities are 
‘the producers and validators of scientific knowledge’ (1996, 178). Kuhn suggested also that 
specialty communities can be identified by examining scientists’ citation networks (178). In his 
view, ‘Scientific communities can and should be isolated without prior recourse to paradigms; the 
latter can then be discovered by scrutinizing the behaviour of a given community’s members’ (176). 
Whereas in sociological literature citation networks are called ‘invisible colleges’ (Price and Beaver 
1966) or ‘social circles’ (Crane 1969), in philosophical literature they are called ‘epistemic interest 
communities’ (Massey 2014). Uskali Mäki suggests that the concept of specialty community can be 
extended to cover interdisciplinary communities that have been formed for the purpose of solving a 
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complex practical problem (2016, 333). In these communities, scientists may have quite different 
educational backgrounds; yet, they share an interest in a particular phenomenon (e.g., climate 
change). 
Some science studies scholars have challenged the assumption that specialty 
communities are the basic organizing units in science. For example, Karin Knorr-Cetina (1982) 
argues that laboratories and research groups deserve more attention than they have received because 
they are the sites of knowledge production. In response to this criticism, many social 
epistemologists have come to recognize the epistemic importance of laboratories and research 
groups (see e.g., Andersen 2016; Wray 2007). Yet, specialty communities continue to be of interest 
to social epistemology because they are the sites of knowledge justification, or more accurately, the 
social practice of knowledge justification. At least ideally, specialty communities provide scientists 
with arenas where research outputs are scrutinized from a variety of perspectives (Longino 1990, 
2002). While individual scientists can conduct research independently and publish individually 
authored papers, specialty communities control the quality of research by means of training, peer 
review, criticism, and replication of results (see also Jacobs 2006; Wray 2011). Sabina Leonelli and 
Rachel Ankeny (2015) suggest that the ability to create and maintain communities is crucial not 
only to the quality of scientific research but also to the integration of data, methods, and insights 
across different geographical locations. 
In order to improve on the standard view of scientific communities, I argue that the 
social cohesiveness of scientific communities is due not only to shared concepts, beliefs, epistemic 
values, and epistemic goals but also to mutual epistemic responsibilities. The duty of epistemic 
responsibility is based on a particular view of epistemic justification. In this view, epistemic 
justification is not merely a matter of having reasons for one’s beliefs but also a matter of providing 
reasons for one’s knowledge claims in a particular social context (see e.g., Reed 2015; Rehg 2009; 
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Williams 2001). Given this view of epistemic justification, epistemic justification is always tailored 
for a particular audience. Yet, a scientist can challenge also the standards of evidence and 
background assumptions endorsed by her audience. As Helen Longino explains, standards of 
evidence may be criticized and transformed in reference to other standards, goals, and values held 
temporarily constant (2002, 131).  
In the actual practice of science, a scientist fulfils her epistemic responsibilities when, 
for example, she publishes her research results in a venue that is recognized by her main audience. 
By communicating her research results in such a venue, she ensures that she has met at least some 
of the standards of argumentation shared by her audience. A scientist fulfils her epistemic 
responsibilities also when she responds to a criticism of her views in a forum recognized by her 
main audience (e.g., a conference, a journal, or some other discussion site for a scientific 
community). An appropriate response may involve a counter-argument to the criticism or a revision 
of her views in light of the criticism. In order to carry out her epistemic responsibilities 
successfully, a scientist needs to make an effort to make her views understandable to her audience. 
I argue that in epistemically well-designed specialty communities, scientists are united 
by mutual epistemic responsibilities because epistemically responsible behaviour strengthens the 
social cohesiveness of specialty communities and facilitates transformative criticism. Let me 
explain first why social cohesiveness is epistemically important and how epistemically responsible 
behaviour contributes to it. Insofar as specialty communities play an important role in the social 
practice of knowledge justification, their social cohesion is of epistemic interest. While an 
excessively high level of cohesiveness may give rise to epistemic problems like groupthink (see 
e.g., Tollefsen 2006), some level of cohesiveness is necessary to give a direction to individual 
scientists’ epistemic activities. Scientists need to have a positive valuation of their community and a 
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sense of belonging to it in order to regard the other members of the community as their main 
audience. 
In order to see how epistemically responsible behaviour can strengthen the social 
cohesiveness of specialty communities, it is important to keep in mind that communities are 
characterized by a tension between agreement and disagreement. While community members are 
united by shared concepts, beliefs, epistemic values, and epistemic goals, they can endorse slightly 
different constellations of these elements, with the consequence that there may not be any 
unambiguous way to define the boundaries of communities or to distinguish members from non-
members. Communities may overlap and individual scientists may belong to several communities 
either simultaneously or in succession (Kuhn 1996, 178). Most importantly, specialty communities 
are arenas for disagreement and controversy. The disagreement and controversy may concern not 
only hypotheses, theories, or methods but also what are seen as the community’s core concepts, 
beliefs, and epistemic values (177). Kuhn (1977) warns us against judging such disagreements as 
necessarily irrational because he thinks that they are essential elements in the development of 
science (see also Solomon 2001). The duty of epistemic responsibility helps us understand how 
specialty communities can maintain their social cohesiveness even when community members 
disagree. When scientists recognize that they have epistemic responsibilities towards other 
community members, they have a reason to be engaged in a controversy instead of ignoring 
disagreement or merely tolerating it.  
In order to understand why epistemically responsible behaviour is important for 
specialty communities, it is important to keep in mind also that specialty communities do not form a 
static social structure of science. As Brad Wray explains, a striking feature of scientific change is 
that some communities are dissolved while new ones emerge (2011, 117). The duty of epistemic 
responsibility helps us understand how this happens. In principle, vanishing communities could 
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have accommodated new discoveries and conceptual changes in a somewhat similar way as those 
communities that undergo a paradigm change. This means that new discoveries and conceptual 
changes do not necessarily lead to the fragmentation of scientific communities. The social structure 
of scientific communities is changed when scientists redirect their epistemic responsibilities from 
one audience to another.  
Epistemically responsible behaviour strengthens also the social cohesiveness of 
speciality communities by fostering relations of trust among community members. By relations of 
trust is meant relations where a person A trusts another person B to do something (Frost-Arnold 
2013). Relations of trust play an epistemic role when A trusts B to believe and to have good reasons 
to believe that p, and this is a reason for A to believe that p (Hardwig 1991). That epistemically 
responsible behaviour is needed to support relations of trust is easy to see especially when scientists 
fail to be epistemically responsible towards the other members of their communities. As Elizabeth 
Anderson explains (2011, 146):  
 
“To persist in making certain claims, while ignoring counterevidence and counterarguments 
raised by others with relevant expertise, is to be dogmatic. To advance those claims as things 
others should believe on one’s say-so, while refusing accountability, is to be arrogant. 
Dogmatists are not trustworthy, because there is no reason to believe that their claims are 
based on a rational assessment of evidence and arguments. The arrogant are not trustworthy, 
because there is reason to believe they are usurping claims to epistemic authority.”  
 
By giving rise to dogmatism and arrogance, epistemically irresponsible behaviour 
undermines relations of trust among community members, thereby weakening the social 
cohesiveness of the community. Epistemically responsible behaviour, on the other hand, nurtures 
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relations of trust among community members. Relations of trust can contribute to the epistemic 
success of specialty communities in at least two ways. First, relations of trust can facilitate 
collaboration among community members, and scientific collaboration enables them to pursue their 
epistemic goals more effectively than working alone (Wray 2002). Second, relations of trust can 
give scientists a reason to rely on other scientists as a source of information so that they can cite 
others’ findings when they seek indirect support for their own results (Hardwig 1991).  
So far I have argued that epistemically responsible behaviour promotes the epistemic 
goals of science by strengthening the social cohesiveness of specialty communities. But this is not 
the only way in which epistemically responsible behaviour advances the epistemic goals of science. 
It can bring about epistemic progress also by facilitating transformative criticism within 
communities as well as across communities. Transformative criticism is conducive to the epistemic 
goals of science directly when it helps scientists eliminate false beliefs and biased accounts of the 
subject matter of inquiry, or when it helps them discover significant truths (Longino 1990, 76). And 
even when criticism does not give scientists a reason to change their views, it can be epistemically 
valuable by forcing them to provide better arguments for their views or to communicate their views 
more clearly and effectively. Criticism can help scientists avoid dogmatism. 
In sum, I have argued that epistemically responsible behaviour promotes the epistemic 
goals of science by strengthening the social cohesiveness of specialty communities and by 
facilitating transformative criticism. However, arguing that epistemically responsible behaviour has 
epistemically beneficial consequences is one thing, and understanding what actually motivates 
individual scientists to behave in an epistemically responsible way is another thing. As we cannot 
expect individual scientists to fully foresee the long-term consequences of their behaviour for 
scientific communities, we cannot assume that the consequences figure in their motivations to 
behave in epistemically responsible ways. In the next section, I turn to the question of what might 
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cause individual scientists to be epistemically responsible. I argue that a moral account of scientists’ 
behaviour is needed to complement accounts that appeal to self-interested or epistemic motives. 
 
3 Coordinating Individual and Community Goals 
   
When social epistemologists study whether particular social practices or institutional 
arrangements promote the epistemic goals of science, they are concerned with the impersonal 
epistemic goals of scientific communities, such as the goal of producing true or empirically 
adequate accounts of some aspects of reality. While individual scientists may be inspired by 
impersonal epistemic goals, they are likely to be motivated primarily by their personal goals. As 
Philip Kitcher explains, individual scientists’ personal goals may be epistemic, non-epistemic, or a 
mixture of epistemic and non-epistemic considerations (1993, 72). Personal epistemic goals are 
typically more specific than the impersonal epistemic goals of specialty communities. For example, 
an individual scientist may aim to understand a particular mechanism or to develop expertise on a 
particular topic in her specialty. Personal non-epistemic goals may include such aims as career 
advancement, recognition from peers, or the aim of helping solve urgent social and environmental 
problems. Kitcher suggests also that epistemic and non-epistemic personal goals easily blur in the 
actual practice of science (72). This is the case when, for example, a scientist aims not only to 
describe a particular mechanism but to be the first one to do so because she believes that priority is 
a means of career advancement.  
The distinction between the personal (epistemic and non-epistemic) goals of 
individual scientists and the impersonal (epistemic) goals of scientific communities gives rise to the 
question of how the two sets of goals are aligned so that the pursuit of personal goals serves 
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impersonal goals instead of undermining them. As Kitcher argues, the gap between personal and 
impersonal goals - or individual and community goals – is epistemically good (or bad) depending 
on whether particular kinds of social arrangements succeed (or fail) in making good epistemic use 
of personal motives (1993, 305). An example of successful coordination is a situation where 
individual scientists’ personal non-epistemic motivations (e.g., the desire for fame) generate a 
distribution of research efforts that serves the impersonal epistemic goals of an entire community 
(see also Solomon 1992, 2001). An example of unsuccessful coordination is a situation where the 
same personal non-epistemic motivations lead some scientists to produce and disseminate research 
papers that are based on fraudulent evidence, thereby endangering the epistemic project of an entire 
community. The coordination of individual and community goals is a pressing problem precisely 
because individual scientists’ personal goals may threaten to undermine the impersonal epistemic 
goals of scientific communities.1 
In order to understand what prompts individual scientists to behave in an epistemically 
responsible way, it is useful to distinguish among three accounts of epistemically responsible 
behaviour: a self-interest, an epistemic, and a moral account. According to the self-interest account, 
scientists behave in an epistemically responsible way because they believe that it serves their own 
non-epistemic ends (e.g., career advancement). According to the epistemic account, scientists 
                                                             
1 By stressing the need to coordinate personal and impersonal goals, I do not claim that scientists’ 
non-epistemic motivations are the main cause of fraud. Nor do I claim that epistemic motivations 
are the best remedy to the problem of fraud. In an empirical study of the causes of scientific 
misconduct, Mark Davis, Michelle Riske-Morris, and Sebastian Diaz (2007) argue that causal 
factors vary greatly from personality factors (e.g., impatience, personal need for recognition) to 
organizational factors (e.g., insufficient supervision and mentoring, non-collegial work 
environment). 
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behave in an epistemically responsible way because they believe that it serves their personal 
epistemic ends (e.g., a better understanding of a particular mechanism). As Kitcher suggests, it is 
plausible to assume that scientists are driven in part by considerations of advancing their careers, 
and in part by considerations of achieving a better understanding (1993, 372). But unlike Kitcher, I 
do not see a reason to limit an account of scientists’ behaviour to a framework in which scientists 
are seen as either ‘sullied’ agents (driven by the desire to receive credit for their work), or 
‘epistemically pure’ agents (driven by the desire to increase their understanding), or ‘mixed-up’ 
agents (371). There is room for yet another option. According to the moral account, scientists 
behave in an epistemically responsible way because they believe that it is their moral duty to do so. 
The moral account differs from the epistemic one because it highlights non-epistemic rather than 
epistemic reasons. The moral account differs from the self-interest one because the non-epistemic 
reasons highlighted are different from the ones highlighted by the self-interest account. When 
scientists act out of moral reasons, they are concerned with the well-being of other human beings 
and not merely with their own well-being.  
I argue that a moral account of epistemically responsible behaviour is needed to 
supplement a self-interest and a purely epistemic account because there are situations in which 
neither the self-interest nor the epistemic account (or a combination of them), is sufficient to explain 
why epistemically responsible behaviour is rational for an individual scientist. In these situations, a 
moral account is necessary in order to understand why epistemically responsible behaviour is 
rational not only from the perspective of scientific communities but also from the perspective of 
individual scientists. 
Let me explain first the limitations of the self-interest account of epistemically 
responsible behaviour. In philosophy of science the self-interest account is advanced by David Hull 
(1988) who believes that scientists are motivated mainly by their self-interests. As Hull explains, 
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‘Scientists cooperate to the extent they do because it is in their own self-interest to do so’ (1988, 
311). In his view, self-interested scientists are guided by the desire for recognition from those 
members of their communities they themselves regard highly (309). The most important form of 
recognition that scientists can receive for their work is its use by other members of their 
communities (309). In the actual practice of science, scientists give recognition to other scientists, 
for example, by citing their works (310). Citations are often used as a criterion in decisions for 
funding, promotion, and career advancement. According to Hull, one of the most important features 
of the social organization of science is that it is not utopian. This means that individual scientists are 
not expected to sacrifice their self-interests for the larger good (304). Hull has a lot of confidence in 
scientific communities’ and institutions’ ability to align individual scientists’ self-interested 
behaviour with the epistemic goals of science so that the former is in the service of the latter. For 
example, he believes that ‘once science is properly understood, it turns out that what is good for the 
individual scientist is by and large good for science’ (304). 2  
I argue that Hull is too optimistic about the ability of scientific communities and 
institutions to coordinate scientists’ self-interested behaviour with the epistemic goals of science. 
For example, if women’s publications are cited regularly at lower rates than men’s publications, the 
reward system of science does not succeed in establishing a systematic connection between 
epistemically valuable contributions and recognition in the form of citations. And if the reward 
system of science does not succeed in linking epistemic goods to the non-epistemic goods that self-
interested scientists value highly, we cannot assume that self-interested behaviour will 
                                                             
2 Hull’s analysis of scientists as self-interested agents has given rise to models aiming to show that 
scientists’ self-interested behaviour does not compromise the epistemic goals of science. For 
discussions of the economics approach to social epistemology, see Mäki (2005) and Pinto (2016), 
and for a more general discussion of game theory, see Amadae (2015).  
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automatically serve the epistemic goals of science. Marianne Ferber (1988) argues that gender bias 
has had on impact on citations in labour economics, financial economics, developmental 
psychology, mathematics, and sociology. She reports that in these fields, references to women’s 
publications constitute a significantly larger proportion of all citations in articles written by women 
than in articles written by men (82). While Ferber acknowledges that scientific quality, like beauty, 
is to some extent in the eye of the beholder, she thinks that a systematic gender bias in citations can 
be revealed in an analysis of relatively large data sets (83). Ferber suggests that men’s tendency to 
cite women authors at lower rates can be attributed to gendered patterns in scientists’ networking 
(e.g., the persistence of the old boys’ networks) rather than to gender differences in research topics 
or in scientific quality (86). 
I regard it as an open empirical question to what extent scientific communities and 
institutions succeed in organizing their reward systems so that epistemically valuable contributions 
will receive recognition in the form of citations and career advancement, if not always, at least most 
of the time. Insofar as it is an open empirical question, we should not assume at the outset that the 
reward system of science is always successful in coordinating scientists’ self-interested behaviour 
with the epistemic goals of scientific communities. 
Besides different forms of bias, the reward system of science is vulnerable to another 
risk. When the reward system of science relies heavily on financial incentives, its functioning 
depends on economic and political factors that are beyond the control of scientific communities. 
This means that whenever the overall funding of scientific research shrinks, the reward system is 
not capable of delivering bonuses to those scientists who have made epistemically valuable 
contributions. Even when an individual scientist has succeeded in making an epistemically 
significant contribution, her epistemic success does not lead to a promotion or an extension of her 
research grant. For a self-interested agent, this is likely to be a confusing and demoralizing 
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experience. It is not my intention to underestimate the importance of funding and properly 
functioning infrastructure for scientific research. Rather, I suggest that an epistemically and/or 
morally motivated scientist is able to cope with diminishing research budgets better than her self-
interested colleague. This is because her scientific work is driven not only by financial rewards. I 
suggest also that it is not wise for scientific communities and institutions to let financial incentives 
play the main role in their reward systems. This is because a financially driven reward system is 
dependent on the capricious nature of economy and politics. 
The limitations of the self-interest account of scientists’ behaviour leads us to consider 
an epistemic account of epistemically responsible behaviour. According to the epistemic account, 
scientists behave in an epistemically responsible way because they think that it helps them achieve 
their personal epistemic goals. One obvious advantage in the epistemic account is that it is relatively 
easy to see how individual and community goals can be coordinated successfully. Personal 
epistemic goals are often intermediate goals the achievement of which is one step towards the 
achievement of impersonal epistemic goals. When this is the case, individual scientists’ pursuit of 
their personal epistemic ends will serve the impersonal epistemic ends of an entire community. 
Also, when scientists are motivated by epistemic considerations, it is unlikely that they will act in 
ways that threaten to compromise the epistemic project of an entire community (e.g. fabricate data). 
Despite these advantages, the epistemic account has a limitation. When a scientist is 
preoccupied with her personal epistemic goals, it may be difficult for her to see why she should 
participate in scientific controversies that will serve mainly the personal epistemic goals of other 
scientists. Yet, from the point of view of the impersonal epistemic goals of scientific communities, 
it would be good if she helped other scientists in the pursuit of their personal epistemic goals.  
This kind of situation arises when scientists work on research topics that will benefit 
from cooperation across specialty communities. For example, some archaeologists have made an 
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attempt to integrate physical evidence with orally transmitted stories about past events (e.g., flood 
stories). As Inkeri Koskinen (2016) argues, the use of orally transmitted stories as evidence, or even 
as clues to evidence, is problematic in the light of folkloristic research. Comparative studies in 
folkloristics suggest that orally transmitted stories have common elements that can be found in 
almost any parts of the world. As these elements may have been invented in several places and they 
may have travelled long distances, they cannot be linked to any specific time and place. Such 
elements are properly understood as mythical, and it is questionable to treat them as historical 
evidence (11).  
If Koskinen is right in her criticism, cooperation between archaeologists and 
folklorists who are experts on orally transmitted stories, is in the epistemic interests of science. 
However, this gives rise to the problem of coordinating scientists’ personal epistemic goals with the 
impersonal epistemic goals of scientific communities. While archaeologists would clearly benefit 
from a cooperation with folklorists, the cooperation does not bring about any obvious epistemic 
benefits to folklorists. An epistemically motivated folklorist may find it satisfying that she has an 
opportunity to correct a misguided method in another specialty; yet, she will probably ask whether 
it is worth the time and effort to do so, especially when the alternative is to use her time and energy 
to advance her own research program. The self-interest account does not help in this case either. 
Volunteering to offer a critical perspective on archaeologists’ research methods may be recognized 
in an acknowledgement section of a scientific article. But this is hardly the kind of credit that a self-
interested folklorist is looking for. As the reward system of science is organized currently, there are 
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no incentives for a self-interested folklorist to attend archaeology conferences or to publish critical 
discussion notes in archaeology journals (see also Koskinen 2016, 12).3  
Given the limitations of the epistemic and the self-interest account, I argue that the 
moral account of epistemically responsible behaviour is needed to explain why it is rational for a 
folklorist to intervene in another specialty when she does not believe that the intervention will serve 
her personal epistemic goals or her career advancement. According to the moral account, she will 
intervene because she thinks that it is her moral duty to do so. As moral motivations are also non-
epistemic motivations, someone may raise the concern that moral considerations, like self-interested 
ones, can undermine the epistemic goals of science. A worrisome scenario is a case in which a 
morally motivated scientist suppresses evidence because she is afraid that it will reduce the 
happiness of her audience. In response to this concern, I argue that it is based on a 
misunderstanding of the moral account. According to the moral account, a morally motivated 
scientist is concerned with the epistemic abilities of her audience rather than with their happiness. 
She follows her epistemic responsibilities because she has moral respect for the audience especially 
in their capacity as knowers. For this reason, a morally motivated scientist would not let happiness 
trump evidence. 
To sum up, I have argued that in some situations cooperation among scientists is in the 
interests of scientific communities but not in the interests of individual scientists (or at least all the 
scientists needed for the cooperation). The epistemic account of epistemically responsible behaviour 
                                                             
3 The situation would, of course, change if there were incentives for scholars and scientists to 
cooperate across disciplines. The rhetoric of interdisciplinarity that can be found in many science 
policy documents does not necessarily mean that there are incentives for cross-disciplinary 
cooperation (Mäki 2016). 
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does not help coordinate individual and community goals when an individual scientist has a hard 
time of seeing how cooperation will serve her personal epistemic goals. The self-interest account is 
not helpful when cooperation does not give a scientist the kind of recognition she needs in order to 
establish herself in their own specialty. The self-interest account may even advise against 
cooperation if a scientist believes that helping others will give them an advantage in a competition 
for the same resources. The moral account provides a solution to the problem of coordinating 
individual and community goals. It can provide a scientist with a reason to cooperate when her 
epistemic and selfish interests cannot do so.4 
 
4 Moral account of epistemically responsible behaviour 
 
In this section, I explain why epistemic responsibility can be understood as a moral 
duty and not merely as an epistemic one. I address two concerns about the moral account. One 
concern is that the moral account is too demanding for most scientists. Another concern is that the 
universal and impartial nature of moral duties is in conflict with the observation that in the actual 
practice of science, epistemic responsibilities are often limited to particular scientific communities. 
I argue that the duty of epistemic responsibility can be understood as a moral duty 
because it actually serves the well-being of other human beings by showing moral respect for them 
especially in their capacity as knowers. Our capacity to give reasons, to understand reasons, and to 
                                                             
4 In saying this I am concerned with cooperation in the sense of participating actively in scientific 
communities. What motivates scientists to participate in collaborations in the sense of co-authoring 
papers is a topic that requires more analysis (see e.g., Frost-Arnold 2013; Wray 2002).  
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respond to reasons is essential to human value (see also Fricker 2007, 44). Thus, if not all human 
beings, at least all well-functioning adult human beings are entitled qua human beings to be taken 
seriously as an epistemic audience. This is a default setting in all social practices of knowledge-
seeking, and it is in need of modification only when there is a reason to doubt someone’s cognitive 
capacities or knowledge-seeking intentions. 
In order to understand how epistemic responsibility can be both a moral and an 
epistemic duty, it is useful to visit the distinction between epistemic and moral virtues. As Julia 
Driver explains, epistemic virtues aim at true or justified beliefs, whereas moral virtues aim at the 
well-being of other human beings (2003, 105). Epistemic virtues such as open-mindedness can, of 
course, contribute also to the well-being of others, but they do not necessarily aim to do so. Open-
mindedness is primarily an epistemic virtue because it aims at true or justified beliefs in the person 
who has the virtue, and this is epistemically valuable even when it does not benefit other human 
beings. Also, some moral virtues can contribute to true or justified beliefs, but they are primarily 
moral virtues because the well-being of other human beings is the main source of their value. For 
example, honesty is primarily a moral virtue because it aims at the well-being of other human 
beings by creating and supporting relations of trust between the person who has the virtue and her 
audience (114). This is morally valuable even when honesty does not lead to true or justified beliefs 
in the person who has the virtue or in her audience. 
In a similar way, I argue that epistemic responsibility is an epistemic duty because it 
aims at justified beliefs in the person who follows the duty as well as in her audience. Epistemic 
responsibility is also a moral duty because it aims at the well-being of other human beings by 
showing moral respect for them especially in their capacity as knowers. This is morally valuable 
even when epistemic responsibility does not lead to true beliefs in the person who follows the duty 
or in her audience. Epistemic responsibility is a prima facie moral duty, that is, a moral duty that 
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may be outweighed by more important moral duties. For example, the moral duty to protect the 
privacy of people is weightier than the moral duty of epistemic responsibility. This means that a 
scientist has a moral obligation to protect the privacy of her informants even when sharing detailed 
information about the informants would be required by her epistemic responsibilities. 
It is important to notice that when epistemic responsibilities are understood as moral 
duties, they are universal in the sense that all knowledge-seekers have them and impartial in the 
sense that they treat all knowledge-seekers in essentially the same way. The universal and impartial 
nature of moral duties poses two challenges to the moral account of epistemically responsible 
behaviour. The first challenge is to understand how the requirements of epistemic responsibility are 
feasible and reasonable for most scientists. Someone may argue against my view that epistemic 
responsibilities should not be understood as moral duties because the moral account of 
epistemically responsible behaviour is too demanding for most scientists. Given the moral account, 
we all have epistemic responsibilities towards all other human beings (at least insofar as we are 
engaged in knowledge-seeking practices). In order to fulfil our epistemic duties towards other 
human beings, we should be able to meet the standards of evidence endorsed by various audiences. 
As the standards of evidence may vary greatly from one audience to another, this task is almost 
impossible to carry out successfully. Indeed, it is not clear whether anyone can actually live up to 
the requirements of epistemic responsibilities if they are understood as universal and impartial 
moral duties. This means also that most scientists will not be able to fulfil their epistemic 
responsibilities even if they wish to do so.  
The second challenge is closely connected to the first one. The challenge is to 
understand how the universal and impartial nature of moral duties is compatible with the 
observation that in the actual practice of science, epistemic responsibilities are understood as local 
and partial. Most of the time scientists behave as if they have epistemic responsibilities primarily 
towards the members of their communities. Scientists sometimes respond to criticism coming from 
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other audiences but they do not address these audiences on a regular basis. Similarly, they 
sometimes give a talk to a larger audience but for obvious reasons, such as lack of time and other 
resources, they do not attempt to communicate all their views to all audiences. They often ignore 
those audiences who they think do not have the competence to contribute to scientific research.  
In order to respond to the two challenges, it is necessary to visit cosmopolitan moral 
philosophy. I suggest that epistemic responsibilities, like other moral duties, can be understood as 
either general or special moral duties. As Robert Goodin explains, general moral duties are the 
duties we have towards other human beings merely because they are human beings, and special 
moral duties are the duties we have towards particular individuals because they stand in some 
special relation to us (1988, 663). The term ‘general’ is meant to suggest that general moral duties 
are universal and impartial. Special moral duties are local and partial. As Goodin explains (665):  
 
‘Whereas our general duties tell us how we should treat anyone, and are hence the same 
toward everyone, special duties vary from person to person. In contrast to the universality of 
the general moral law, some people have special duties that other people do not. In contrast to 
the impartiality of the general moral law, we all have special duties to some people that we do 
not have to others.’  
 
Relations among family members, friends, and fellow countrymen are examples of special relations 
that are thought to involve special moral duties.  
Goodin is concerned with the question of where special moral duties come from and 
how they fit together with general moral duties. According to his cosmopolitan moral philosophy, 
special moral duties are essentially distributed general moral duties (1988, 678). They are created 
by assigning general moral duties to particular human beings standing in particular relations. This 
means also that the moral force of special moral duties is derived from the moral force of general 
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moral duties (679). To defend cosmopolitanism, Goodin argues that in many cases the most 
efficient way to implement general moral duties is to assign them to particular people standing in 
particular relations thereby creating a division of moral labour. In some cases, a distribution of 
moral duties is the only way to implement general moral duties because some of them are too 
demanding for some human beings.  
Let me use Goodin’s example to illustrate this claim. People who happen to be on a 
beach on a particular day all have a general moral duty to rescue a person who is in danger of 
drowning. For many reasons not all persons on the beach are actually capable of carrying out this 
duty. If they all attempted to meet the duty to rescue the person in the water, the outcome would be 
a chaotic situation where more than one person is in danger of being drowned. A better way to 
implement a general moral duty is to assign it to a person who is well suited for the task of rescuing 
people in water: the lifeguard. When a general moral duty is assigned to a particular person standing 
in a particular relation, it gives rise to a special moral duty that the person has. Thus, the lifeguard 
has a special moral duty to help people in life-threatening situations on the beach. 
In Goodin’s analysis, special moral duties are morally justified insofar as they are 
distributed general moral duties. He does not deny that voluntary agreements play a role in the 
generation of special moral duties. The assignment of a moral duty to a particular person standing in 
a particular relation (e.g., the lifeguard on duty) is based on the person’s voluntary agreement to 
sign on for the role and the duties that come with the role. However, voluntary agreements can play 
a role merely in the distribution of moral duties but not in the justification of moral duties. The 
special moral duty the lifeguard has is morally binding because it is ultimately based on a general 
moral duty. 
Goodin’s account of special moral duties as distributed general moral duties implies 
also that some people bear a primary responsibility for a particular moral duty whereas some others 
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bear merely a secondary responsibility. When the moral duty to help a person in a life-threating 
situation has been assigned to the lifeguard, the lifeguard has a primary responsibility to see that no 
one is drowned, with the consequence that the other parties are released from a primary 
responsibility to so do. However, the other parties still have a secondary responsibility to look after 
the safety of other people on the beach. This means that if the lifeguard is not up to his or her task, 
then the others will have to pick up the primary responsibility for the duty. 
 Building on Goodin’s argument, I suggest that the epistemic responsibilities scientists 
have towards the other members of their communities can be understood as special moral duties. I 
call them special epistemic responsibilities to distinguish them from general epistemic 
responsibilities. Whereas general epistemic responsibilities are universal and impartial, special 
epistemic responsibilities are limited to special relations, such as relations among the members of 
particular epistemic communities. That special epistemic responsibilities are local and partial means 
that scientists can legitimately give a priority to the community’s standards of evidence and the 
objections coming from the community. However, this is the case only as long as a particular 
division of epistemic labour prevails. If the division of epistemic labour is challenged (on the 
grounds that it no longer serves the epistemic goals of science), then scientists may have to 
reconsider towards whom they have special epistemic responsibilities. 
In order to explain how general and special epistemic responsibilities can co-exist 
without conflicts, I introduce a view I call epistemic cosmopolitanism.5 Epistemic cosmopolitanism 
is an epistemic application of Goodin’s cosmopolitan account of special moral duties. Epistemic 
cosmopolitanism states that (a) insofar as we are engaged in knowledge-seeking practices, we have 
general epistemic responsibilities, and (b) the special epistemic responsibilities scientists have as 
                                                             
5 The version of epistemic cosmopolitanism I defend here is a revised version of the one I have 
discussed in Author (XXXX). 
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members of scientific communities are essentially distributed general epistemic responsibilities. 
Epistemic cosmopolitanism enables me to respond to the two concerns about the moral account of 
epistemically responsible behaviour. When special epistemic responsibilities are understood as 
distributed general epistemic responsibilities, the tension between the two disappears. The universal 
and impartial nature of general epistemic responsibilities is not in conflict with the local and partial 
nature of special epistemic responsibilities when the latter are seen as a means to implement the 
former. By following one’s special epistemic responsibilities, one fulfils one’s share of general 
epistemic responsibilities. 
In response to the worry that the moral account is too demanding, I argue that a 
division of epistemic labour is a key to understanding how the demands of general epistemic 
responsibilities can be transformed into requirements that are feasible and reasonable for most 
scientists. General epistemic responsibilities are no longer overwhelming when they are distributed 
to particular human beings standing in particular relations thereby generating special epistemic 
responsibilities. One could even argue that in epistemically well-designed scientific communities, 
no scientist is put into a position where she is not capable of carrying out her special epistemic 
responsibilities. That the requirements of special epistemic responsibilities should be feasible and 
reasonable for individual scientists may in part explain why some scientific communities are 
fragmented thereby giving rise to novel specialty communities (see also Price 1986). The 
explanation may be that special epistemic responsibilities are attainable in the emerging specialty 
communities, whereas scientists’ special epistemic responsibilities in the fragmented communities 
have become too burdensome.  
In sum, I have argued that scientific communities can be understood moral 
communities in the sense that community members are united by special epistemic responsibilities. 
That scientists have special epistemic responsibilities as members of scientific communities helps 
us understand why most scientists behave so that they give priority to one audience. I have argued 
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that their behaviour is justified in the light of their special epistemic responsibilities, and their 
special epistemic responsibilities are justified in the light of their general epistemic responsibilities. 
However, special epistemic responsibilities may change when an existing division of epistemic 
labour is challenged.  
This will lead me back to the example discussed in the previous section. As the 
division of epistemic labour is understood currently, a folklorist does not have special epistemic 
responsibilities towards archaeologists; her special epistemic responsibilities lie primarily in her 
own speciality community. However, an existing division of epistemic labour can be challenged on 
the grounds that it does not serve the impersonal epistemic goals of scientific communities. If the 
cooperation between archaeologists and folklorists is in the epistemic interests of science, a division 
of epistemic labour should be changed so that, at least in some cases, archaeologists and folklorist 
should have mutual special epistemic responsibilities. This is the basis for claiming that a folklorist 
has a moral obligation to intervene in the problematic use of orally transmitted stories in 
archaeology.  
 
5 Epistemic Contractarianism versus Cosmopolitanism 
 
 In Section 2, I have argued that the duty of epistemic responsibility can promote the 
epistemic goals of science indirectly by strengthening the social cohesiveness of scientific 
communities and by facilitating transformative criticism. This gives an epistemic justification to the 
duty of epistemic responsibility. Insofar as epistemic responsibility is also a moral duty, we need to 
be concerned with its moral justification. In Section 4, I have argued that (i) the moral justification 
for general epistemic responsibilities lies in the view that human value in itself requires us to take 
others seriously as an epistemic audience, and (ii) the moral justification for special epistemic 
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responsibilities flows from the moral justification of general epistemic responsibilities. I have called 
this view epistemic cosmopolitanism. In this section, I defend epistemic cosmopolitanism against a 
possible objection. 
A possible objection to epistemic cosmopolitanism is that there is an alternative and 
equally plausible account of the moral justification of special epistemic responsibilities. What I call 
epistemic contractarianism is the view that the moral force of special epistemic responsibilities is 
derived from a voluntary agreement to become a member of a particular scientific community (and 
such an agreement can take place independently of whether there are or are not general epistemic 
responsibilities). While epistemic cosmopolitanism acknowledges that scientific communities are 
based on voluntary membership, it differs from epistemic contractarianism in that the moral force of 
special epistemic responsibilities is derived from general epistemic responsibilities, not merely from 
voluntary agreements. In what follows, I argue that epistemic cosmopolitanism is a superior view to 
epistemic contractarianism. 
At first sight, epistemic contractarianism appears to be a plausible position because it 
resonates with the standard view of scientists’ moral obligations. According to the standard view, 
scientists have both general obligations as human beings and role obligations as scientists. Whereas 
general obligations are justified in the light of general moral theories, role obligations owe their 
justification to scientists’ voluntary accepting their role and the obligations that come with the role. 
According to the standard view, role obligations do not come with reductions of general obligations. 
As Heather Douglas explains, role obligations are layered on top of general obligations (2014, 971).  
According to Michael Hardimon, a role obligation is a moral requirement ‘which 
attaches to an institutional role, whose content is fixed by the function of the role, and whose 
normative force flows from the role’ (1994, 334). While some role obligations are non-contractual, 
contractual role obligations are the ones which are acquired by ‘signing on for the roles from which 
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they derive’ (354). In signing on for a role, one agrees to carry out the duties of the role (356). 
Hardimon suggests that in some cases ‘signing on for a role’ should be understood to mean that one 
identifies with the role, and the role identification is the source of reasons and motivations to carry 
out the role obligations (358). Yet, Hardimon emphasizes that roles and the obligations attached to 
them are not fully in the control of the person who has voluntarily signed on for them. As he 
explains, social roles are institutionally defined structures of rights and duties (354).  
In epistemic contractarianism, the special epistemic responsibility a scientist has as a 
member of a scientific community is understood to be a contractual role obligation. Also, it is the 
voluntary nature of the agreement to sign on for the role that is responsible for the moral force of 
the role obligation. The voluntary agreement has to be done by the person whose obligation it is. 
Mere social expectations are not sufficient to generate morally binding role obligations. The 
agreement to become a member of a scientific community may of course be something that takes 
place tacitly and over time (see also Hardimon 1994, 363).  
I do not deny that scientists have contractual role obligations and that these 
obligations play an important role in research ethics. Yet, I argue that special epistemic 
responsibilities are not contractual role obligations. And therefore, epistemic contractarianism is not 
a tenable position. 
One problem in epistemic contractarianism is that it cannot explain how general 
epistemic responsibilities can be converted into doable and bearable requirements. This is because 
voluntary agreements cannot lighten the burden of general epistemic responsibilities. Voluntary 
agreements can merely generate role obligations that are added on top of general obligations. For 
example, a manager cannot argue plausibly that she has no moral obligations towards other citizens 
because she has voluntarily entered a contract with a company and this contract involves a moral 
duty to look after the interests of the shareholders of the company. The argument is not plausible 
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because the manager has general moral obligations towards other citizens, and the role obligations 
she has as a manager are added on top of her general moral obligations.  
Another problem in epistemic contractarianism is that it grants too much moral weight 
to voluntary agreements. If we accept the view that voluntary agreements can create contractual role 
obligations, then we are bound to accept the highly problematic view that voluntary agreements can 
give justification for obligations that run against our other moral duties. For example, let us assume 
that a person has voluntarily agreed to become a member of a racist organization and the other 
members of the organization expect her to be loyal to the organization. If we accept the view that 
voluntary agreements can create contractual role obligations, then we have to admit that the person 
has a genuine moral duty to be loyal to the organization. This conclusion is in conflict with the view 
that the person, like all of us, has a moral duty to treat all human beings with respect and to 
recognize their equal human value.  
I suggest that the conflict between the person’s contractual role obligations and 
general obligations is generated by giving too much moral weight to voluntary agreements. The 
conflict can be avoided by abandoning the view that the moral force of contractual role obligations 
is derived solely from voluntary agreements. Insofar as contractual role obligations are morally 
justified, there has to be another source of moral justification besides voluntary agreements. The 
roles that people accept voluntarily have to be morally acceptable in the first place in order to 
generate genuine moral duties (see also Jeske 2014; Scheffler 2001). A voluntary membership in a 
racist organization does not create genuine moral duties simply because both the organization and 
the role are without moral justification. 
In sum, I have argued that epistemic contractarianism is an untenable position for two 
reasons, one being that it cannot reduce the burden of general epistemic responsibilities, and another 
one being that it grants too much moral force to voluntary agreements. Epistemic cosmopolitanism 
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avoids both of these two problems. When special epistemic responsibilities are understood as 
distributed general epistemic responsibilities, they lighten the burden of general epistemic 
responsibilities, that is, the epistemic responsibilities scientists have towards all other human beings 
merely in virtue of participating in knowledge-seeking practices. Epistemic cosmopolitanism avoids 
also the other problem in epistemic contractarianism, the problem that it grants too much moral 
force to voluntary agreements. When special epistemic responsibilities are understood as distributed 
general epistemic responsibilities, their moral justification is derived from the moral justification of 
general epistemic responsibilities. It is not derived merely from a voluntary agreement to be a 
member of a particular scientific community.  
 
6 Conclusion 
 
That scientific communities are epistemic communities is self-evident. That they are 
moral communities is not self-evident. I have argued that epistemically well-designed scientific 
communities are moral communities in the sense that community members have epistemic 
responsibilities vis-à-vis other community members. A moral account of epistemically responsible 
behaviour is needed to complement the view that scientists are motivated by their self-interests or 
their own epistemic ends. A moral account suggests that scientists behave in an epistemically 
responsible way because they believe that it is their moral duty to do so. When epistemic 
responsibilities are understood as moral duties, they are followed because they are believed to 
contribute to the well-being of other human beings. This means also that epistemic responsibilities 
are universal and impartial in the sense that they transcends any particular epistemic community. 
Yet, we have epistemic responsibilities only insofar as we are engaged in knowledge seeking-
practices.  
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I have introduced a view I call epistemic cosmopolitanism to explain how the 
universal and impartial nature of moral duties is compatible with the observation that epistemic 
responsibilities are often confined to particular epistemic communities. The tension between the 
universal and impartial nature of general epistemic responsibilities and the local and partial nature 
of special epistemic responsibilities disappears as soon as we realize that special epistemic 
responsibilities can be understood as distributed general epistemic responsibilities. A division of 
epistemic labour is a key to understanding that general epistemic responsibilities need not be too 
demanding for most human beings. General epistemic responsibilities can be converted into feasible 
and reasonable requirements by distributing them so that some human beings have epistemic 
responsibilities towards some audiences and some others towards some other audiences.  
Epistemic cosmopolitanism has an interesting implication to our views concerning the 
relations between scientific communities and lay communities. The epistemic responsibilities 
scientists have towards the other members of their communities are not radically different from the 
epistemic responsibilities they have towards other human beings. The reason for this is that in both 
cases, scientists’ epistemic responsibilities are distributed general epistemic responsibilities. From a 
moral point of view, they are made of the same stuff. This means also that a voluntary agreement to 
join one epistemic community does not give one a permission to sign off from one’s epistemic 
responsibilities towards other epistemic communities. That scientists’ epistemic responsibilities are 
often confined to particular epistemic communities is merely a matter of maintaining an efficient 
division of epistemic labour.  
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